0x01 背景
现在的WEB程序基本都有对SQL注入的全局过滤,像PHP开启了GPC或者在全局文件common.php上使用addslashes()函数对接收的参数进行过滤,尤其是单引号。二次注入也是一种比较常见的注入,它涉及到入库和出库。因为有全局转义所以入库的时候:
Insert into table (username) values (‘hack’’);
这样入库后转义符就会消失变成了hack’,这样如果hack’出库被带入查询的话就会成功的引入了单引号导致注入。
漏洞来源于乌云:http://www.wooyun.org/bugs/wooyun-2014-068362
0x02 环境搭建
看背景我们使用了低版本的74cms程序,版本为3.4(20140310)
①源码网上可以搜到,我打包了一份:http://pan.baidu.com/s/1c1mLCru
②解压到www的74cms(20140310)目录下,浏览器访问http://localhost/74cms(20140310)),然后按照提示一步步安装即可,安装遇到问题请自行百度或谷歌,成功后访问如下图:
0x03 漏洞分析
Part1:源码结构
源码的结构比较清晰,应该是审计过最清晰的结构了,主要有下面三块内容:
index.php引入了common.inc.php文件,我们跟进common.inc.php,发现了处理gpc的函数:
<?php if (!empty($_GET)) { $_GET = addslashes_deep($_GET); } if (!empty($_POST)) { $_POST = addslashes_deep($_POST); } $_COOKIE = addslashes_deep($_COOKIE); $_REQUEST = addslashes_deep($_REQUEST);
|
可以看到,服务端处理GET和POST请求的变量时都会做addslashes处理。
Part2:审计过程
1.首先在个人发布简历处:
elseif ($act == 'make4_save') { $resume_education = get_resume_education($_SESSION['uid'], $_REQUEST['pid']); if (count($resume_education) >= 6) showmsg('教育经历不能超过6条!', 1, $link); $setsqlarr['uid'] = intval($_SESSION['uid']); $setsqlarr['pid'] = intval($_REQUEST['pid']); if ($setsqlarr['uid'] == 0 || $setsqlarr['pid'] == 0) showmsg('参数错误!', 1); $setsqlarr['start'] = trim($_POST['start']) ? $_POST['start'] : showmsg('请填写开始时间!', 1, $link); $setsqlarr['endtime'] = trim($_POST['endtime']) ? $_POST['endtime'] : showmsg('请填写结束时间!', 1, $link); $setsqlarr['school'] = trim($_POST['school']) ? $_POST['school'] : showmsg('请填写学校名称!', 1, $link); $setsqlarr['speciality'] = trim($_POST['speciality']) ? $_POST['speciality'] : showmsg('请填写专业名称!', 1, $link); $setsqlarr['education'] = trim($_POST['education']) ? $_POST['education'] : showmsg('请选择获得学历!', 1, $link); $setsqlarr['education_cn'] = trim($_POST['education_cn']) ? $_POST['education_cn'] : showmsg('请选择获得学历!', 1, $link); //看到这里有个插入表“qs_resume_education”的操作,将教育背景相关的字段入库 if (inserttable(table('resume_education'), $setsqlarr)) { check_resume($_SESSION['uid'], intval($_REQUEST['pid']));
|
2.这里看到insert入库了,可以尝试加个单引号,入库后就会消除转义字符。我们先继续跟进inserttables后的check_resume函数
//检查简历的完成程度 function check_resume($uid, $pid) { global $db, $timestamp, $_CFG; $uid = intval($uid); $pid = intval($pid); $percent = 0; $resume_basic = get_resume_basic($uid, $pid); $resume_intention = $resume_basic['intention_jobs']; $resume_specialty = $resume_basic['specialty']; //获取教育经历,出数据库了 $resume_education = get_resume_education($uid, $pid); if (!empty($resume_basic)) $percent = $percent + 15; if (!empty($resume_intention)) $percent = $percent + 15; if (!empty($resume_specialty)) $percent = $percent + 15; if (!empty($resume_education)) $percent = $percent + 15; if ($resume_basic['photo_img'] && $resume_basic['photo_audit'] == "1" && $resume_basic['photo_display'] == "1") { $setsqlarr['photo'] = 1; } else { $setsqlarr['photo'] = 0; } if ($percent < 60) { $setsqlarr['complete_percent'] = $percent; $setsqlarr['complete'] = 2; } else { $resume_work = get_resume_work($uid, $pid); $resume_training = get_resume_training($uid, $pid); $resume_photo = $resume_basic['photo_img']; if (!empty($resume_work)) $percent = $percent + 13; if (!empty($resume_training)) $percent = $percent + 13; if (!empty($resume_photo)) $percent = $percent + 14; $setsqlarr['complete'] = 1; $setsqlarr['complete_percent'] = $percent; require_once(QISHI_ROOT_PATH . 'include/splitword.class.php'); $sp = new SPWord(); $setsqlarr['key'] = $resume_basic['intention_jobs'] . $resume_basic['recentjobs'] . $resume_basic['specialty']; $setsqlarr['key'] = "{$resume_basic['fullname']} " . $sp->extracttag($setsqlarr['key']); $setsqlarr['key'] = str_replace(",", " ", $resume_basic['intention_jobs']) . " {$setsqlarr['key']} {$resume_basic['education_cn']}"; $setsqlarr['key'] = $sp->pad($setsqlarr['key']); if (!empty($resume_education)) { //遍历教育经历所有字段,加入到数组里 foreach ($resume_education as $li) { $setsqlarr['key'] = "{$li['school']} {$setsqlarr['key']} {$li['speciality']}"; } } $setsqlarr['refreshtime'] = $timestamp; } //这里对教育经历做了次更新操作,二次注入由此产生! updatetable(table('resume'), $setsqlarr, "uid='{$uid}' AND id='{$pid}'"); updatetable(table('resume_tmp'), $setsqlarr, "uid='{$uid}' AND id='{$pid}'");
|
3.我们填写一份简历简单试验下,在教育经历处学校名称字段填写aa’
保存后发现报错语句:
0x04 漏洞证明
构造获取数据库用户相关信息的POC:
查看简历发现简历姓名变成了root@localhost:
查看sql语句发现更新语句是成功执行的:
最后,有兴趣的同学可以继续获取其它的管理员账户等相关字段的信息。
本文由HackBraid整理总结,原文链接:http://www.cnbraid.com/2016/02/19/sql3/,如需转载请联系作者。