Piaoger按：
还是SaaS窘境，只不过这次是翻译了一篇不错的英文Blog，翻译的过程很苦，有些地方至今也还觉得生涩，慢慢改吧。
不过怎么说，收获良多，无论是SaaS，还是Disruptive Innovation, 抑或English。
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SaaS窘境
Software as a Service (SaaS) presents a classic “disruptive innovation.” Of course, in 2010 that’s not new news.
软件即服务(SaaS)展示出经典的”破坏性创新”。当然，在2010这并不是什么新闻。
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What is remarkable is how closely the SaaS market’s evolution matches the definition of a disruptive technology that was described by Harvard Business School professor Clayton Christensen in The Innovator’s Dilemma (he later replaced the term with “disruptive innovation” in his subsequent book, The Innovator’s Solution). In fact, the SaaS dilemma that incumbent software vendors currently face is playing out almost page-for-page from Christensen’s books. As a result, we can use the disruptive innovation framework to gain insight into what’s to come in enterprise software.
值得注意的是，SaaS市场的进化与哈佛商业学院教授Clayton Christensen在The Innovator’s Dilemma一书中破坏性技术的定义是如此吻合(在其后的The Innovator’s solution一书中，他改为破坏性创新)。事实上，处于主导地位软件厂商现在所面临的SaaS困境在Christensen的书中几乎可以得到完全演绎。正因为这样，我们可以借助破坏性创新框架以探讨企业软件所要面临的处境。
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After a decade of deriding SaaS technology as too simple, functionally incomplete and insecure, vendors such as Microsoft, Oracle, SAP and thousands of incumbent “on-premise” software vendors are now embracing SaaS. It’s an awkward embrace – one that threatens to cannibalize existing revenue steams, divert resources and eat up profits.
在多年嘲笑SaaS技术是如此简单、功能匮乏并且不安全之后，Microsoft、Oracle、SAP和成千主导的” on-premise”软件厂商正在接受它（这是一种令人难堪的接受：它危及收入流、转移资源并吞噬利润）。
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Of course, the innovator’s dilemma doesn’t destroy every incumbent. These incumbent market leaders are powerful, resilient innovators themselves. But for armchair quarterbacks like us, this the next five years will present a fascinating game to watch.
当然，创新者窘境并会不毁灭所有的主导者。这些主导市场的领导者本身就是强大和坚韧的创新者。但是对于我们这些纸上谈兵的人来说，今后的五年给我们准备了一场精彩的好戏。
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What is a Disruptive Innovation?
何为破坏性创新？
Disruptive innovation refers to new solutions – often technologies – that
through a new delivery model, alternate pricing model or target market segment
are able to disrupt existing competitive dynamics dramatically. For example,
SaaS offers a new delivery model (i.e. hosted “in the cloud”), a new pricing
model (i.e. subscription) and initially targeted smaller customers.
破坏性创新与新的解决方案（通常是技术）相关，通过一种新的交付方式、可供选择的收费模式或目标市场细分有可能戏剧性地破坏当前的动态竞争。例如，SaaS提供了新的交付方式（即托管在“云中“）、新的收费模式（即订阅）而且起初总是面向更小的客户群。
注：动态竞争
http://wiki.mbalib.com/wiki/%E5%8A%A8%E6%80%81%E7%AB%9E%E4%BA%89%E7%90%86%E8%AE%BA
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Initially, these disruptors target the least profitable customer segments – typically smaller or unsophisticated buyers. These are the only customers whose requirements are limited enough to accept the bare bones feature-set of the new system. Meanwhile, they appreciate the new model (i.e. it’s cheap and easy to get started). We certainly saw this in SaaS as small businesses or autonomous departments adopted customer relationship management (CRM) systems like Salesforce.com as early as 1999. For them, SaaS CRM was “good enough.”
起初，这些破坏者面向利润最薄的客户细分（通常是小众或菜鸟级的购买者）。新系统中少的得不能再少特征集，就能满足他们的需求。比较而言，他们喜欢这种新的模式（便宜而且易于上手）。在SaaS 中，我们的确看到，早在1999年就有小业务或自治部门就采用了类似于Salesforce.com的客户关系管理（CRM）系统。对他们来说，SaaS CRM足矣。
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Over time, however, disruptive innovators improve their performance and feature-set and can meet the needs of more sophisticated customers. Combine that with a little buzz around their new model (e.g. everybody’s talking about cloud computing these days), and the incumbent vendors start to take note. Of course, the incumbent still has plenty of ammunition to dismiss the new technology, since it remains functionally deficient relative to incumbent products and the most demanding customer segments (e.g. SaaS penetration into the ERP market remains limited).
然而，随着时间的推移，通过提升性能和增加特征，破坏性创新已经可以满足更多高级客户的需求。何况，还有围绕着新模式的叽叽喳喳（比如这些天每个人都在谈论云计算），以及主导厂商也开始关注。当然，主导者依然有充足的弹药去击退新的技术，因为在同主导产品相比和大多数要求严格的细分市场来说，它在功能上依然有缺陷（比如，SaaS依旧很难打入ERP市场）。
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I’ll posit that SaaS is now entering the penultimate – and most contentious – stage of disruption. At this point, the innovators start to gain serious momentum. Their products approach functional parity and they begin to steal substantial market share. The incumbents finally get serious about defending their traditional markets by releasing their own version of the innovation (in the case of SaaS, that means true web-based, on-demand, cloud computing, not just hosted client/server software). Unfortunately, it is often too late. Incumbents remain apprehensive about cannibalizing existing revenue and they face challenges replicating the innovation. Typically, most incumbents stagnate, decline and fade into obscurity. Only a few nimbly transition to the new model.
我将假设SaaS正在进入倒数第二（也是最容易引起争议）的破坏阶段。这时候，创新者开始具有非同小可的动能。他们的产品接近于功能对等并开始偷偷获得实质性的市场份额。主导者终于紧张起来，通过发布创新版本来保护他们的传统市场（假设SaaS意味着真正的基于网络、按需、云计算，而不仅仅是托管的Client/Server软件）。不幸的是，这通常都太晚了。主导厂商担心会影响到他们的当前的收益，同时还要面临复制创新的挑战。一般来说，大多数主导者都会停滞不前、堕落并消失在昏暗之中。仅有少数主导者能够敏捷地转变到新的模式。
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The innovator now becomes the incumbent and new innovators emerge. The cycle repeats.
这些创新者现在变成了主导者，然后新的创新者出现。周而复始。
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SaaS Disruption Battles are Well Underway
SaaS破坏之战还在继续。
Christensen mentions Salesforce.com in his second book, The Innovator’s
Solution:
This company, with its inexpensive, simple, Internet-based system, is disrupting the leading providers of customer relationship management software, such as Siebel Systems.
Christensen他的第二本书The Innovator’s Solution中提到了Salesforce.com：
这个公司，以它廉价的、简洁的和基于因特网的系统，正在破坏客户关系管理软件的领导提供商，比如Siebel Systems。
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I worked at another leading CRM vendor back when Salesforce.com was just a start-up. I remember meetings where executives derided the system as a toy. Most Salesforce.com implementations were just a half dozen users and most customers paid their subscription fees with a credit card (Gasp!). Since then, Salesforce.com has exceeded $1 billion in revenue and incumbent market-leader Siebel Systems sold out to Oracle after hitting tough times.
在Saleforce.com刚刚起步的时候，我在另外一家居于领导地位的CRM厂商工作。我记得在会议上，管理层总嘲笑这个系统只是个玩具。大多数Saleforce.com的实施，就那么几个用户，而且大多数的用户都用信用卡支付订阅的费用（Gasp!）。从此，Salesforce.com已经拥有超过10亿美元的年收入，而市场的主导厂商Siebel System却陷入困境而出售给Oracle。
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While Salesforce.com in the CRM market is the best example, the SaaS dilemma is playing out in numerous software markets. Gmail and Google Apps are nascent yet serious threats to Microsoft’s Outlook/Exchange and Office cash cows. We use both of the Google services extensively. NetSuite is a contender in enterprise resource planning (ERP), but hasn’t dented SAP or Oracle too badly as of yet.
Salesforce.com在CRM市场是最好的例子，与此同时，SaaS窘境还在许多的软件市场延续。尚乳臭未干的Gmail和Google Apps威胁着Microsoft的Outlook/Exchange和Office现金奶牛。我们普遍使用着这两种服务。NetSuite是企业资源管理（ERP）的竞争者，但还没有能危及到SAP或Oracle。
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Most interesting, however, is how this same battle is being waged by innovators in so many lesser followed market segments: SaaS construction project management, SaaS electronic medical records, SaaS property management, SaaS retail point of sale. The list goes on…
然而，最有趣的是，同样的战争，创新者在众多少拥有较少跟随者的细分市场将如何开战：SaaS 建筑项目管理、SaaS电子病历记录、SaaS财产管理、SaaS零售卖点管理。名单还在变长ing。。。
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Most SaaS Shortcomings are Addressed
SaaS被诟病的缺点
As I mentioned earlier, I believe we are entering the final stages of SaaS
disruption. The SaaS model and its proponents have not defeated the incumbents,
but SaaS solutions have reached functional parity to the point where incumbent
derisions are starting to fall on deaf ears.
正如之前所提到的，我相信我们正在进入SaaS破坏的最后阶段。尽管SaaS模式和它的拥护者还没有击败主导者，SaaS解决方案在功能上的对等已经达到了可以无需理睬主导厂商嘲笑的程度。
Let’s examine each of the top five objections to SaaS:
让我们逐一审视反对SaaS的5个最大的理由：
- Web browsers are not interactive enough. This was true when web applications required a full page refresh to complete a transaction, but the maturation of JavaScript, AJAX, Adobe Flex and other web user interface technologies addressed this. HTML 5 will put this one to rest for good. I find my SaaS apps faster and more dependable than any on-premise app.
浏览器的交互性不够。当Web程序需要整页刷新以完成事务，这是事实，但是JavaScript，AJAX，Adobe Flex和其他Web UI技术的成熟可以解决这个问题。HTML5将了结这个问题。我发现我的SaaS程序比任何” on-premise”程序都快并值得依赖。
- Hosted data is not secure enough. This one always perplexed me, since so many of us were comfortable with web banking as early as ten years ago. Few systems could be more valuable than financial transactions. Moreover, very few software buyers can afford to implement the same security infrastructure as a professional SaaS data center.
托管的数据不够安全。这一点常让我迷惑，因为如此多的人早在十年之前就已经习惯了网上银行。很少的系统能够比金融交易更有价值。更况且，很少有软件购买者有能力实现与具有与专业的SaaS数据中心同样的安全基础设施。
- It’s not possible to integrate SaaS. This was true when few SaaS vendors had built APIs and there was no middleware for SaaS. Nowadays, API integration to SaaS applications is non-trivial, but not any more difficult than on-premise integration. I should know; we just finished a successful integration to Marketo, a SaaS marketing vendor.
不可能集成SaaS。诚然，很少的SaaS提供商开发API，并且没有针对SaaS的中间件。如今，API集成到SaaS程序还不是一件小事，但是它不会有” on-premise”集成更难。我本来应该知道的；我们刚刚成功完成了SaaS市场提供商Marketo的集成。
- You can’t customize SaaS systems. Again, this is changing. Many SaaS applications remain fairly “packaged,” but many vendors have successfully positioned this as a benefit (i.e. “adopt our best practices”). At the same time, SaaS customization tools are maturing. Salesforce.com has built an entire development environment, force.com.
无法定制SaaS系统。再次声明，事情正在改变。尽管许多SaaS程序依然被完整 “打包“，但很多厂商已经成功把它们定位为benefit（即”提供最佳实践“）。同时，SaaS定制工具正慢慢成熟。Salesforce.com已经建立了一整套开发环境：force.com.
- Big companies want to own the software, not rent. This may be still be true in some cases, but in this economy the recurring nature of subscription payments is attractive. It also puts more of an onus on the vendor to earn their future subscription payments. I’m not convinced that this presents a concrete competitive advantage for incumbents.
大公司想拥有软件，而不是出租。尽管这在某些情况下依然是事实，但是在这个经济体系中中，订金的可续性是非常有吸引力。它使得厂商有更多责任去争取未来订金。我不相信，这对大企业来说会展示出具备强有力的竞争力。
Incumbents are Now Challenged to Counter SaaS
面对SaaS，主流厂商饱受挑战
Now that SaaS vendors and incumbents are locked in a real battle – the gloves
are off and incumbents are releasing their own SaaS systems – our analysis
turns to the big challenges that incumbents will face. Let’s examine the five
most significant characteristics of SaaS systems, and then explore why they are
great for SaaS purists and a real challenge for incumbent on-premise vendors.
现在，SaaS厂商和主导者卷入一场真正的战斗中（手套已经摘掉，主导者正发布他们自己的SaaS系统），我们的分析转向主导者将面临的巨大挑战。让我们审视SaaS系统最显著的5大特性，然后解释为什么对SaaS拥趸是很棒的，而对主导的” on-premise”厂商则是一个真正的挑战。
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Great for SaaS companies |
Tough for incumbents |
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Browser-based |
They can promote the benefits of not installing and maintaining client-side software. Plus anyone can use a web browser! |
Moving to a web-based architecture is a near-complete rewrite. "Web-enabled" options are temporary, at best. |
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Subscription pricing |
Not needing to justify a big purchase up front means fewer approvals and fewer risk-averse buyers to assuage. Also, great recurring revenue. |
This is the core cannibalization issue: moving to subscription pricing will stall growth and maybe lead to revenue declines for some time. |
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Multi-tenant architecture |
With all users on one codebase and database, changes are made in one location, but roll out globally. Also, computing resources are shared. |
With thousands of installs, it's impossible to consolidate. There are incremental benefits to multi-tenancy, but the legacy customers remain. |
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Rapid release cycles |
With changes being made to one codebase/database, releases can be rolled out weekly, even nightly. More releases = better products. |
The quarterly, bi-yearly or annual release cycle is deeply ingrained in the DNA of an on-premise development organization. |
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Bought by business, not IT |
It's far easier to sell to business units with their own budget, without the need for IT approval or budget. Faster sales cycles = growth. |
IT relationships are a core advantage of incumbents. With SaaS, those relationships are less relevant - a competitive barrier is lifted. |
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Great for SaaS companies |
Tough for incumbents |
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基于Web |
无需安装和维护客户端软件。而且每个人都用浏览器。 |
迁移到基于Web的架构相当于重写。“可网络化“选项只是最多只是暂时的。 |
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订阅付费 |
无须为大采购预付款进行辩解，意味着需要更少建议，和更少的风险厌恶者要去安抚。同时还代表着常续的收入 |
这是一种同室操戈：转向订阅可能减缓发展并可能导致收入下降 |
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多租户架构 |
由于所有用户使用同一套代码和数据库，一处改变而全局批量更新。同时，计算资源是共享的。 |
数千个安装是不可能去合并的。尽管多租户有这些好处，但历史用户还在。 |
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快速发布周期 |
由于所有用户使用同一套代码和数据库，每周都可以发布更新，甚至是晚上。更多的版本发布=更好的产品 |
一季度、半年或一年的发布周期已经是” on-premise”开发机构根深蒂固的DNA了。 |
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Bought by business, not IT |
让每个商业分支使用自己的预算变得容易，而无需IT批准或者预算。更快的周期=成长 |
IT关系是主导者核心优势。利用SaaS，这些关系就没那么无法避免（一个竞争壁垒并解除）。 |
It’s Not Over Yet – Not Even Close
战斗还没有完-甚至还没有接近尾声
Microsoft, Oracle and SAP still own the large enterprise market and the SME
market. In hundreds of niche software markets, on-premise incumbents dominate.
Even ten to fifteen years into the evolution of SaaS, SaaS vendors still
possess minimal market share relative to incumbent vendors. While still
powerful and often growing, all of these incumbents face the daunting challenge
of SaaS disruption. Moreover, each of the major incumbents has started in
earnest on credible SaaS offerings.
Microsoft，Oracle和SAP依然拥有很大的企业用户市场和中小型企业（SME）市场。在数百个利基软件市场中，”on-premise”主导还处于支配位置。尽管在经历了10到15年的进化后， SaaS相对于主导者来说，依然只能拥有很小的市场份额。当它们依旧强大且继续成长，所有这些主导者都正视SaaS破坏挑战的恐吓。此外，主导者已经开始认真地提供可靠的SaaS。
Note: 利基市场指向那些被市场中的统治者/有绝对优势的企业忽略的某些细分市场，指企业选定一个很小的产品或服务领域，集中力量进入并成为领先者，从当地市场到全国再到全球，同时建立各种壁垒，逐渐形成持久的竞争优势。 选择一个细分的消费群体，获得最大的边际收益
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Microsoft has released Microsoft Dynamics CRM Online – the first Dynamics family application to be offered in a SaaS model. Microsoft has also released Microsoft Office Online as a counter to Google Docs.
微软已经发布了Microsoft Dynamics CRM Online （第一个以SaaS模式提供的动态系列应用）。Microsoft还发布了Microsoft Office Online以对抗Google Docs。
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Oracle, meanwhile, continues to grow its Oracle OnDemand solution set. While much of Oracle OnDemand consists of managed services for traditional on-premise solutions, their SaaS CRM offering (acquired through the Siebel deal) is true SaaS. So too are other solutions they acquired in recent years.
同样，Oracle还在增加它的Oracle OnDemand解决方案集。Oracle OnDemand包含了为传统” on-premise”解决方案所提供的可管理服务，而他们所提供的SaaS CRM（通过收购Siebel）则是真正的SaaS。他们近年来收购的其他解决方案也是如此。
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Finally, SAP’s Business ByDesign appears to be a pure SaaS, on-demand offering that is operating independently from the SAP mothership. Our own conversations with SAP employees have shown that the company is maintaining an arms-length relationship with the Business ByDesign team so that this in-house “start-up” can truly function as a nimble SaaS entity, unconstrained by SAP’s on-premise legacy.
最后，SAP的Bussiness ByDesign看起来是一个纯粹的SaaS，按需交付、与SAP母舰独立运作。在我们与SAP员工的交谈中可以看出，SAP与Business ByDesign 团队保持一定距离，以便使这个机构内部的 “Start=up”能够作为敏捷的SaaS实体运作，而不必拘泥于SAP的” on-premise”传统。
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If the disruption examples and case studies in Christensen’s book are a guide, we can expect to see a massive number of incumbent vendors stall, fade and become irrelevant over the next decade. Others will deftly navigate the transition.
如果破坏的例子和Christensen书中的个案研究具有指导意义，我们会看到大量的主导者厂商在下一个十年内停滞不前，消逝然后变得毫不相关。其他的主导厂商则能敏捷地完成迁移。
In our comments section below, I’d like to start a conversation about which incumbent vendors will fade and which will transition. Please share your opinion.
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原文：
http://www.softwareadvice.com/articles/enterprise/the-software-as-a-service-dilemma-104071/
Piaoger后记：
On-premise没有硬译，它是与On-demande相对应的一种模式。
上一篇与SaaS/Disruptive Innovation相关的文章是从Adobe Subscription editions扯到破坏性创新